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I. Introduction 
As college enrollment rates have increased, so too have concerns about rates of college 
completion. Around 45 percent of United States college students and nearly 25 percent of 
Canadian college students fail to complete any college program within six years of 
postsecondary enrollment (Shaienks and Gluszynksi 2007; Shapiro et al. 2012). Those who do 
finish now take much longer than they used to (Turner 2004; Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner 
2010; Babcock and Marks 2011). Delays and dropouts may be both privately and socially costly. 
Struggling college students often show little evidence of skill improvement (Arum and Roksa 
2011). They pay a higher cost in foregone earnings than those who do finish, while losing the 
benefit of any possible “sheepskin effects” from degree completion. Time on campus is also 
subsidized at public colleges and universities, so repeated course failures and long completion 
times are costly for taxpayers. A recent analysis by Harris and Goldrick-Rab (2010) shows 
steadily declining degree-to-expenditure ratios in American public colleges, a trend generated by 
falling completion rates as well as increasing sticker prices. 
In an effort to boost grades and on-time graduation rates, most universities deploy an 
array of support services. These efforts reflect a practical response to an important problem, but 
evidence that academic support services improve outcomes is mixed at best. A randomized trial 
discussed by Scrivener and Weiss (2009) finds that campus support services generate small 
improvements in grades and reduce student attrition, but Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009) 
and MacDonald, Bernstein, and Price (2009) find virtually no effect from support services. Part 
of the problem seems to be that take-up rates for most support services are low. More pro-active 
programs that facilitate higher take-up and more intensive support have been found to be more 
successful than relatively passive interventions offering only “service availability” (Scrivener, 
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Sommo, and Collado 2009; Bettinger and Baker 2011).  
A parallel effort to boost college achievement and completion looks to financial 
incentives. Traditional need-based grant aid – which makes up the bulk of North American aid – 
flows to recipients in a manner that is mostly independent of academic performance, while 
embedding little incentive for timely degree completion. Merit-based aid, on the other hand, 
depends on academic achievement. Most merit awards go to top performing students, who can be 
expected to do reasonably well with or without support. Performance-based awards for students 
not already on top are a new but rapidly expanding policy development. If successful, such 
awards may improve academic outcomes, increase the rate of degree completion, and ultimately 
save both taxpayers and recipients money.  
Georgia's Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) program, introduced in 
1993, is a pioneering effort in this direction. Funded by lottery ticket sales, HOPE covers tuition 
and fees at any Georgia public college or university for students who earned at least a 3.0 high 
school GPA. Students lose the HOPE scholarship if their college GPA dips below 3.0. Georgia 
HOPE has been a model for dozens of similar state programs. Accumulating empirical evidence 
suggests HOPE-like award schemes improve high school achievement (see, for example, Pallais 
2009). On the other hand, such programs also appear to reduce recipients’ college course loads 
(Cornwell et al. 2005), increase their automobile consumption (Cornwell and Mustard 2007), and 
reduce attendance at out-of-state colleges and college quality (Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar 
2006; Cohodes and Goodman 2013).  
Estimates of the effects of HOPE-style programs on college enrollment and completion 
are mixed. Dynarski (2008) reports large increases in Georgia and Arkansas’s college-educated 
populations a few years after the introduction of HOPE and a similar Arkansas program, while 
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Castleman (2013) estimates that Florida’s HOPE-style public university scholarship boosted 
recipients’ in-state public college completion rates. By contrast, recent analyses by Sjoquist and 
Winters (2012a; 2012b) find no effect when looking at a broader range of state programs with 
more recent data and updated clustered standard error estimation.  
Most research on HOPE-style programs uses observational designs. Among the most 
credible of the HOPE-style evaluations, Scott-Clayton’s (2011) regression discontinuity 
investigation of West Virginia's Providing Real Opportunities for Maximizing In-State Student 
Excellence (PROMISE) scholarship generates evidence of substantial increases in four and five-
year graduation rates. Importantly, however, this study shows the PROMISE scholarship 
increased GPAs and credits earned during the first three years of college only, when students 
faced a minimum GPA requirement to maintain award eligibility. This suggests that the incentive 
effects of the scholarships are larger than the income effects resulting from greater financial aid.  
Incentive experiments and quasi-experimental research designs in European universities 
have also produced mixed results. Using a regression-discontinuity design, Garibaldi et al. 
(2012) found that higher tuition induces faster degree completion by Italian women. De Paola, 
Scoppa, and Nistico (2012) also find substantial positive effects of a randomized financial award 
for business administration students in southern Italy. On the other hand, randomized evaluations 
of financial incentives offered to Dutch university students generated little overall effect 
(Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw 2010; Leuven, et al. 2011).1
In an effort to encourage on-time completion and retention, a few incentive programs 
target college credits for those already enrolled. In a randomized evaluation managed by MDRC, 
Barrow et al. (2012) find significant effects on credit accumulation for a subsample of Louisiana 
community college students enrolled at least half time. Early results from a series of similar 
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randomized evaluations show small but statistically significant increases in cumulative earned 
credits by the first or second term (Cha and Patel 2010; Miller et al. 2011; Richburg-Hayes, 
Sommo, and Welbeck 2011). Evaluating a Canadian community college retention program, 
MacDonald et al. (2009) report significant increases in GPA and retention; this program paid 
$750 per semester for those with a GPA above 2.0, who maintained a full load and made use of 
academic services. 
Motivated by the wide range of findings to date, we implemented a financial incentive 
demonstration program that builds on the lessons from earlier work, including ours. Overall 
academic performance in our study population was poor. Our merit aid therefore rewarded 
above-average performance for enrolled students. Specifically, the “Opportunity Knocks” (OK) 
experiment, piloted at a large Canadian commuter university, was designed to explore whether 
students who qualify for need aid can also be motivated by merit aid, and whether this improved 
performance would carry over into subsequent years. Incentivizing higher grades in one year 
could generate better subsequent performance through habit formation or learning by doing, even 
after incentives disappear.  
OK was offered to first- and second-year students who applied for financial aid. Those 
who signed up were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. In contrast to earlier 
programs that primarily rewarded students for achieving GPA thresholds, treated students earned 
$100 for each class in which they attained a grade of 70 or better and an additional $20 for each 
percentage point above 70 percent (roughly the average grade in the control group). A student 
with a full course load scoring 75 in every course qualified for $2,000 over the course of the 
school year (10 × ($100 + (5 × $20))). Treated students also had the opportunity to interact with 
randomly assigned peer advisors. These were upper-class students who had been trained to 
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provide advice about study strategies, time management, and university bureaucracy. 
OK was developed in view of the findings from our earlier randomized evaluation on a 
similar campus. The Student Achievement and Retention (STAR) project (Angrist, et al. 2009) 
offered three interventions, the most successful of which combined financial incentives at widely 
spaced GPA thresholds with academic support services. OK provided an opportunity for 
replication and the chance to offer a more intense and perhaps even more successful treatment. 
By rewarding performance in each class and setting a low bar for the minimum payment, we 
hoped to make incentives stronger (92 percent of controls earned a grade of 70 percent or above 
in at least one class). This contrasts with STAR awards, which were paid out to only about 18 
percent of eligible students. We opted for a partially linear payout scheme on theoretical grounds 
(see, for example, Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987).  
OK awards were potentially more generous than those offered in STAR; high achievers 
could earn up to $700 per class.2 The expected OK award among controls was $1,330, while the 
expected STAR award was only about $400. OK engendered more program engagement than 
STAR as well: Almost 90 percent of OK participants had some kind of interaction with peer 
advisors and/or the program website, in contrast with about 50 percent engagement in STAR.  
OK had many novel and promising features: linear incentives at the class level, high 
reward levels, and high program engagement. It’s therefore interesting, surprising, and somewhat 
disappointing that OK had only a modest impact on targeted outcomes. Treated second-year 
students earned about 13 percent more than expected based on the distribution of control-group 
grades, suggesting the program had an incentive effect. The strongest effects appear around the 
$100 award threshold, where completion of payment-qualifying courses increased, especially 
among students who appeared to understand the program well. OK also increased the number of 
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second-year courses graded above 70 and grade points earned above 70, but these effects were 
not large enough to generate a significant increase in students’ overall GPAs. OK generated no 
discernible impacts in the year after incentives were removed. 
The following section describes the OK campus setting, program rules, and our random-
assignment research design. Section III reports descriptive statistics and indicators of program 
engagement. Section IV discusses the experimental results while Section V reports on 
participants’ impressions of the program as revealed in post-program surveys. The paper 
concludes in Section VI with a brief look at how our results fit in with other post-secondary 
incentive demonstrations. We also discuss possible explanations for differences between the 
findings reported here and those in our earlier study. 
II. Background and Research Design 
Motivated by the mixed results for college incentives to date, we developed an 
intervention meant to build on what we saw as the strongest features of the program discussed in 
Angrist, et al. (2009). The OK intervention combined incentives with academic support services; 
a combination of incentives and services appeared to be especially effective in the earlier STAR 
evaluation, which ran in a similar setting. The services delivered through STAR were more 
elaborate and expensive, however. STAR included the opportunity to participate in facilitated 
study groups as well as email-based peer mentoring, while OK services consisted of email-based 
peer mentoring only. We opted for email because the take-up rate for STAR’s facilitated study 
groups was low. Also, because a number of STAR participants saw the awards as essentially out 
of reach, OK award rates were designed to be much higher. OK awards were also paid out more 
frequently, in this case, every term. Unlike STAR, the OK study population consisted only of 
students that had applied for financial aid prior to the start of the school year. This was partly in 
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response to political constraints but it also seemed likely that aid recipients would be most 
responsive to the opportunity to earn additional awards. 
Opportunity Knocks (OK) was piloted on an Ontario commuter campus affiliated with a 
large public university. The six-year completion rate on this campus is about 73 percent. There 
are about 2,500 students in an entering class. In late summer of 2008, we invited 1,05f first years 
and 1,073 second years to participate in OK. Eligible students are those who had requested 
financial aid, had an email address, had a high school GPA recorded in the university 
administrative information system, and who had enrolled for at least 1.5 credits for the upcoming 
fall term. Invitees who completed the intake survey and gave consent were eligible for random 
assignment. Of the 1,271 students who completed the survey and were eligible, 400 were treated. 
Treatment assignment was stratified by year (first and second) and sex, with 100 in each group. 
Within sex-year cells, assignment was stratified by high school GPA quartile, with 25 in each 
group (the analysis below controls for strata). 
Previous studies have generally rewarded students for completing courses or reaching 
GPA thresholds (see, for example, Angrist et al. 2009, Cha and Patel 2010). In contrast, OK 
participants earned $100 for each class in which they received at least a 70 percent grade, and an 
additional $20 for each percentage point above 70.3 For example, a student who earned a grade 
of 75 in each of five classes over one semester (five classes constitute a full load) would have 
received 5 × ($100 + (5 × $20)) = $1,000. We focused on grades near 70 because anything worse 
is typically seen as unsatisfactory and because awards for lower levels of achievement are likely 
to be prohibitively expensive (a GPA of at least C- is required for graduation; this translates to a 
percentage grade in the low 60s). Still, a grade of 70 is attainable for most students in at least one 
class, and the OK awards schedule provided incentives for above-average performance as well. 
Angrist, Oreopoulos, and Williams 9 
The services component of OK assigned treated students to (trained and paid) same-sex 
peer advisors. Peer advisors were enthusiastic upper-year students or recent graduates with good 
grades. Each peer advisor covered 50 participants. Advisors emailed advisees once every two to 
three weeks, whether or not the advisees responded. These emails offered advice on upcoming 
academic events and workshops and guidance relevant to key periods in the academic calendar, 
such as midterms and finals. Advisors also provided information about OK scholarships, 
including reminders of the scholarship calculation and payment schedules. Advisors frequently 
invited their clients to turn to them for help with any academic or personal issues that seemed 
relevant to academic success. 
III. Descriptive Statistics and Program Response 
The data for this study come primarily from the university records containing information 
on applicants, enrolled students, and course grades. We supplemented this with data from a 
baseline survey used to identify the population eligible for random assignment, as well as more 
descriptive focus-group style information collected from a few subjects after the experiment. 
Table 1, which presents descriptive statistics, shows that OK participants were mostly 
college students of traditional age. Control group students had average grades around 82 percent 
in high school. Less than half of the control group spoke English as a first language, reflecting 
the relatively high proportion of immigrants on the OK host campus. About half of control group 
parents graduated from a postsecondary institution (44 percent of mothers and 53 percent of 
fathers), while nearly 80 percent of parents graduated from high school, a figure comparable to 
the Canadian average for college student parents. The OK scholarships were within reach for 
most participants: 92 percent of controls would have received an award under the OK 
scholarship formula. Table 1 also documents the fact that random assignment successfully 
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balanced the background characteristics of those in the treatment and control groups (as 
evidenced by insignificant effects in the “Treatment Difference” columns). Although not 
documented in the table, student course selection and completion as measured by number of 
courses, difficulty, or subject area are also well balanced between treatment and control groups 
for the whole sample and within subgroups (random assignment occurred after students had pre-
registered for courses).4 
The OK intake survey, included in the packet describing the program to those eligible for 
random assignment, included two questions meant to gauge subjects’ understanding of program 
award rules. The first asked students to calculate the award amount for one class, and the second 
asked them to calculate the total award amount from five classes. Two-thirds of the students 
answered the second question correctly (documented in Table 1), and over 80 percent answered 
the first question correctly. Those who responded incorrectly to either question received a 
clarification by email. In the program analysis, we look at treatment effects for the entire sample 
and for those who answered the second assessment question correctly to see if those who 
understood the scholarship formula also had a stronger program response. 
Student involvement with OK was high. This can be seen in Table 2, which shows that 
about 73 percent of treated students checked their scholarship earnings on the program website. 
Women were nine points more likely to check than men. Only 38 percent of treated participants 
sent an email to their assigned peer advisor in the fall, but this number increased to 50 percent in 
the spring. By year’s end, 70 percent had emailed an advisor at least once over the course of the 
year. First-year students and women were more likely to contact advisors than were second-year 
students and men. At least 86 percent of treated students made some kind of program contact: 
they emailed a peer advisor, checked scholarship earnings, or emailed program staff. 
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Following a presentation of intention-to-treat effects, we discuss two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimates of treatment effects using a dummy indicating any program contact as the 
endogenous variable. The idea here is that subjects who made no program contact of any kind, 
and did not even check their scholarship earnings, are unlikely to have been affected by either 
OK awards or advisor services. In other words, we think of a dummy indicating any contact as a 
good surrogate for program treatment status. 2SLS estimates treating program contact as an 
endogenous variable should therefore capture the effect of treatment on the treated for the 
subpopulation of active program participants (because endogenous compliance is one-sided, the 
local average treatment effect  is the treatment on the treated effect; see Imbens and Angrist, 
1994, for details).  
IV. Program Effects 
A. Main Findings 
 A natural starting point for our analysis is a comparison of the amount earned by the 
experimental group with the earnings that students in the control group would have been entitled 
to had they been in the program. A large program effect should be reflected in larger-than 
expected earnings, where expected earnings are measured using the grade distribution in the 
control sample.5 Our estimates of earnings and other effects come from regressions like this one: 
(1) yij = αj + βTi + δ´Xi + εij,  
where yij is the outcome for student i in stratum j, the αj are strata effects, Ti is a treatment 
assignment indicator, and Xi is a vector of additional controls.6 Causal effects of the OK program 
are captured by β. Since treatment is randomly assigned, covariates are unnecessary to reduce 
omitted variables bias in the estimated treatment effects. Models with covariates may, however, 
generate more precise estimates. 
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The OK program had no impact on earnings for first-year men and women, a result that 
can be seen in columns 1, 4, and 7 of Table 3. On the other hand, there is some evidence of 
higher-than-expected earnings for second-year treated students, especially second-year men. The 
estimated effect on second-year men in the spring term, reported in column 5, is a significant 170 
dollars. Estimates over the course of the year are about 255 dollars for second-year men and 180 
dollars for all second years.7 Both of these estimates are significant at better than a 10 percent 
level and amount to 15-20 percent of a standard deviation of hypothetical control group earnings.  
Our experimental design stratifies on sex, year of study, and high school GPA, mitigating 
concerns about mining for significant findings in subgroups. The analysis by sex and class is of 
substantive interest and a pre-specified feature of our research plan. Still, it’s worth noting that 
under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect for all four sex by class subgroups, the 
probability that at least one observed full-year effect is significant at the 8 percent level is 1 – 
0.924 = 0.28 (assuming no outcomes correlation across subgroups). The results in Table 3 emerge 
more strongly, however, when we limit the sample to students who understood the award formula 
well and are consistent with a marked response in grades around the 70 percent award threshold, 
as discussed below. 
The question of whether the OK program caused more complex distributional shifts in 
hypothetical earnings is explored in Figure 1, which shows treatment and control earnings 
distributions in separate panels by sex and year. The only (marginally) significant distributional 
contrast in the figure is for second-year men (using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). On the other 
hand, the contrast by treatment status for second-year women looks similar to that for men. For 
both men and women, treatment seems to have shifted second-year earnings from below a level 
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around 1,500 to more than 1,500 dollars. The shift emerges roughly one hundred dollars above 
mean earnings for controls. 
The evidence for an effect on average grades (measured on a 0-100 scale) and GPA is 
weaker than that for earnings. The grades results appear in Table 4a and the GPA results appear 
in Table 4b. Average grades for second-year men increased by about 2.5 percentage points in the 
spring but this estimate is only marginally significant, and it’s the only significant result in the 
table. The corresponding GPA effect amounts to about 0.27 GPA points, an estimate significant at 
the 5 percent level.8 Power is not an issue with these comparisons. For the full sample, we are 
able to reject GPA and grade effects as small as 10 percent of the control standard deviation, 
meaning that our zeros are quite precise. 
The earnings gains documented in Table 3 are necessarily explained by increases in the 
number of courses graded at least 70 and grade points over 70. Table 5 reports full-year program 
effects on each of these components of the scholarship award formula. Panel A shows effects on 
the number of courses in which a student earned a grade of at least 70. Treatment appears to have 
increased the number of over-70 grades awarded to second-year men by almost a full course. The 
number of over-70 courses increases by about half a course for all second years. These estimates 
are reasonably precise. On the other hand, the estimated effects on grade points earned over 70 
are not estimated very precisely. The only (marginally) significant point gain is for all second 
years, an effect of 6.2 percentage points. It’s also worth noting, however, that the magnitudes 
come out such that effects on total earnings are equally distributed between a threshold effect at 
70 and awards for points over 70. 
OK may have had a weaker effect on grades and GPA than on earnings because students 
substituted effort from classes with a grade above 70 to classes with a grade below 70. To test 
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this claim and look for additional evidence of effects concentrated around the award threshold, 
we estimated treatment effects on indicators for grade>g, where g runs from 60 to 80 (reported in 
Figure 2; these plots also show the control grade distribution). This investigation uncovers no 
negative treatment effects on courses above the higher thresholds, suggesting that students 
generally did not substitute effort from higher- to lower-graded courses.9 
We found no evidence of an increased likelihood of crossing any threshold for first years. 
Treatment appears to have increased the likelihood that second-year women earned a grade of 
72-74, a series of effects concentrated around the minimum award threshold. Effects 
concentrated around the threshold may be evidence of strategic grade-seeking behavior on the 
part of treated students. For example, students who expected a grade around 68 or 69 may have 
made a special effort (through negotiation or extra work) to clear 70. On the other hand, 
treatment appears to have boosted the grades of second-year men over a wide interval running 
from 60-75 percent. This pattern of effects weighs against a negotiation-based view of the 
incentive response, at least among men. 
Although most students appeared to understand the OK program rules and award 
formula, a non-trivial minority did not. Those who misunderstood the formula linking grades and 
awards seem less likely to have been motivated by the awards. We therefore report estimates for 
a sample restricted to participants who correctly applied the OK earnings formula to an example 
in the baseline survey (information collected before random assignment). Two-thirds of the 
sample evaluated the example correctly. 
Extrapolation from this selected subgroup is necessarily speculative, but if we assume 
that only those who understand the program change their behavior in response to OK incentives, 
average causal effects on those who understand program rules provide a measure of “theoretical 
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effectiveness.” Specifically, this parameter captures an upper bound for what the program might 
do when it becomes part of the routine. We'd expect to approach this bound over time, were 
schemes like OK a regular part of the college landscape. Estimates limited to the correct-
responders sample are reported in Table 6. 
Estimates for correct responders show larger program effects on earnings than the 
estimates computed using the full sample. Specifically, earnings gains are estimated to have been 
370 for second-year men and 245 for all second years, both significant at the 5 percent level. On 
the other hand, neither GPA nor grade effects are significantly different from zero. The apparent 
difference in findings for grades and earnings is explained by the last two rows of Table 6, which 
reports estimates for the components of the award formula in the restricted sample. These 
estimates show reasonably clear effects on the number of courses above 70 with weaker effects 
on points earned above. The shift in grades around the 70 percent threshold was apparently 
inadequate to boost overall GPA by a statistically significant amount. 
Given the modest program effects observed during the treatment period, it seems unlikely 
that OK boosted achievement substantially in the longer-run. This conjecture is confirmed in 
Table 7, which reports full-sample treatment effects for fall 2009 (the semester after the program 
ended). The results in Table 7 show marginally significant positive effects on average grades and 
GPA for first-year women and in the pooled sample of first years (who are second years in the 
post-treatment period), but these effects are small. The post-program outcomes also offer a 
specification test for the analysis above, since we would not expect to see threshold effects 
around 70 percent in the post-program period. There is no evidence of a treatment effect on the 
number of fall 2009 courses graded at or above 70 percent.10 
B. Subgroup Differences 
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The results presented differ by gender and year in school. First years do not appear to 
have responded to the OK program at all, while treated second years – particularly second-year 
men – showed some improvement in grades, especially in courses graded over 70. Although we 
cannot be sure why results differ by sex and class, we hypothesize that first-years did not respond 
as strongly because many first-year students have not yet developed successful study techniques, 
raising their costs of grade improvement beyond OK’s marginal returns. 
The impact range of OK’s marginal incentives might also depend on how well students 
can target their grades. For example, a student with accurate grade knowledge may only respond 
to the $100 payment at 70 if she has a course currently graded just below 70. A student with 
inaccurate or imprecise grade knowledge may respond to the $100 payment even if his actual 
grades are well below or above 70. A possible explanation for the gender difference in our 
findings is a female advantage in effort targeting in response to the $100 payment. Figure 2 
(discussed in detail above) shows localized positive treatment effects for second-year women 
around 72 to 73 percent, resulting in little effect on grades overall. Treated second-year men, 
however, increased courses graded above most thresholds from 60 to 75, contributing to stronger 
overall effects. It also seems likely that more-experienced second years could target grades better 
than first years, though high improvement costs for first years appear to have overwhelmed the 
marginal incentives. 
C. Additional Results 
We might expect OK incentives to be more powerful for financially constrained students. 
But treatment effects come out similar in subgroups defined by expected financial aid and 
whether students expressed concerns about funding. Effects are somewhat larger in the 
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subsample of students whose parents had not been to college than among those with college-
educated parents, but the gap by parents’ schooling is not large or precisely estimated. 
Effort substitution from easy to hard classes might also explain the small treatment 
effects. To maximize their award, OK participants should substitute effort from difficult classes 
to easy classes, where the financial return to effort is higher. However, treatment effects do not 
vary by class difficulty, as measured by the average class grade among control students (results 
available upon request). As noted above, course enrollment, difficulty, and completion are also 
unaffected, and students do not appear to substitute effort to focus solely on the larger incentive 
at 70 percent. 
 The effects of program assignment reported in Tables 3 to 7 are diluted by non-
compliance, that is, by the fact that some of those assigned to treatment did not really participate 
in the program because they were unaware of their assignment or uninterested in the program 
offerings. It’s therefore worth estimating the effect of the scholarship and advisor treatment on 
program participants. The decision to engage with the program is not randomly assigned; this is a 
choice made by those offered the opportunity to participate. However, we can use the randomly 
assigned offer of OK treatment as an instrument for program take-up. By virtue of random 
assignment the OK offer is unrelated to characteristics of eligible students. The OK offer is also 
highly correlated with participation status: As shown in Table 2, 86 percent of those offered OK 
were engaged in some way – either through program/advisor contact or through checking 
scholarship earnings – while no one in the control group had access to OK awards or services. 
We assume that those with no program engagement were unaware of and therefore unaffected by 
the OK awards and services. The overall first stage effect of OK offers on participation 
(awareness) is around 0.88, controlling for strata (see Table 8). Moreover, because no one in the 
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control group participated, 2SLS estimates in this case capture the effect of treatment on the full 
sample of program participants, as described in Bloom (1984) and Imbens and Angrist (1994). 
Program participants are a self-selected group, but effects of OK on these students are of interest 
because they tell us how much achievement was boosted for those who were clearly aware of 
and responded to program opportunities in some measurable way.11 
The first stage effect of OK offers on participation rates is between 0.84 and 0.9 in the 
full sample and between 0.86 and 0.92 in the subsample that appears to have understood OK 
program rules. The first-stage estimates appear in the first row of each panel in Table 8, which 
also reports 2SLS estimates of the effect of participation on participants. Adjusting reduced-form 
offer effects (the estimates of program effects reported in Tables 3-6) for non-compliance 
necessarily leads to somewhat larger treatment effects, in this case larger by about 10-20 percent.  
The most impressive effects in Table 8 are for the number of courses in which students 
earned a grade above 70. Here, effects on second years in the full sample are on the order of two-
thirds of a course, while the gains among those who understood the program well amount to 
almost a full course (an estimate of 0.91 with a standard error of 0.33, reported at the bottom of 
column 8). The last column of Table 8 shows a marginally significant effect on the number of 
courses in which students earned at least 70 among all students who understood the program well 
(pooling men and women, and first and second years). The effect for all men is also significant at 
the 5 percent level in this sample, with a marginally significant impact on second-year women. A 
robust and substantial impact on hypothetical earnings and points above 70 also emerges from 
the 2SLS estimates in Panel B. At the same time, neither the earnings effects nor the increase in 
the number of courses graded above 70 translated into higher overall average grades among 
participants. 
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V. Student Impressions 
The OK sign-up survey asked students to predict their average grades in two scenarios, 
one as an OK participant and one as a non-participant. To encourage a thoughtful response to this 
question, we offered those who answered the opportunity to win a $500 prize to be given to the 
student whose predictions came closest to the mark. About 60 percent predicted the same grade 
either way and the average predicted effect on grades was about 2.2 points. This is considerably 
larger than most of the effects reported in Tables 6 and 8. It also seems noteworthy that those 
who predicted a positive response do not appear to have responded more strongly than those who 
predicted no effect.  
After the program ended, we asked students who predicted no effect in the intake survey 
why they had expected this. Of the 226 emails sent to treated participants predicting no effect, 
only 34 responded. Most of these respondents said they were planning to do as well as possible 
either way. For example, one said: “Before starting courses, I had already decided that I would 
do my best. And so, I felt a scholarship would be an added motivation, but fundamentally it came 
down to my own ability and commitment.” Two thought the award was too remote, commenting: 
“I predicted the program would have no effect because it provides a long-term reward for regular 
short-term behavior (daily intense studying).” Only three respondents said the incentives were 
too small. One said OK was “not too catchy and/or something worth dying for.” Another 
mentioned the 70 percent threshold: “I believe the cash reward for each course was not high 
enough per percentage point above 70 percent. If the cash reward was perhaps 30 or 40 dollars 
per percent point above 70 percent, I would've worked even harder.”  
We also surveyed a random sample of 50 students from the treatment group at the end of 
the school year (May 13, 2009), offering $25 movie gift certificates to those who responded. 
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Among the 30 respondents to this survey, 27 said the scholarships motivated them. Some thought 
the program was very effective. For example, one respondent commented: “Every time I began 
to lose interest in a particular course, I would remind myself that I just need to well . . . keep with 
it; the rewards will be tremendous. A scholarship is one such reward . . . and it sure is helpful, as 
it lifts a lot of the financial burdens I’m faced with when it comes to paying tuition & other fees.” 
Others saw the program was somewhat effective, as in this comment: “This scholarship did 
affect my motivation to study at some point . . .” Respondents often cited concerns about tuition 
and fees as a motivating factor that boosted their interest in OK.  
 Half of the post-program treated respondents felt the program led them to study more, 
though some felt their opportunity for more study time was limited. This comment was typical: 
“The program made me study more, but not much. I usually follow my schedule between work 
and school. So the amount of time I could have spent on study is somehow limited.” Others felt 
the program helped them focus on schoolwork: “As someone who gets sidetracked easily, I kept 
it in mind that staying focused would pay off in more than one way, and so yes, it did affect the 
amount of time I devoted to studying.” Another said, “I think what’s great about the program is 
that when you feel like you’re beginning to procrastinate, you think about the outcome of this 
program and want to get back to studying.” On the other hand, one second-year student reporting 
feeling somewhat demoralized by OK: “I did abnormally poor this year compared to my usual 
standards and it just so happened to coincide with Opportunity Knocks. The money reminder just 
kind of made me feel ‘worse’ about myself.” 
 Among those who responded to the post-program follow-up survey, almost all felt the 
program improved their academic performance. Some appreciated the opportunity to earn 
scholarships for good but not necessarily outstanding grades: “Personally, I don’t find that [the 
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university] offers as many scholarship opportunities as other [universities], so I think it was 
rewarding to know that my academic performance was acknowledged and rewarded.” Some felt 
they increased performance out of financial concerns: “[E]specially now with the economic 
downfall, it is extremely difficult to muster up the finances to help pay for tuition without relying 
on OSAP [financial aid]. I kind of looked at Opportunity Knocks as my employer who gives me 
more money the better I performed in my studies.” One student volunteered the view that the 
program would have a long-lasting effect on him/her: “The program had significantly improved 
my grades! And I cannot wait to see what I can accomplish next year.”  
Everyone we contacted afterwards reported that they received peer advisor e-mails about 
once or twice a month. All but one of the respondents said the advisor e-mails were helpful. One 
noted, “I think the advisor made good decisions between sending us important reminders and 
information without being redundant. It was especially important to receive the e-mails about the 
scholarship money quickly after marks were sent in.” Another said, “I find it very useful that 
someone was actually helping me through school.” All but one respondent felt the program was 
worth continuing. Virtually everyone seemed grateful for having being selected for OK. One 
respondent closed with this endorsement: “The OK Program has been an essential part of my 
student experience, and in many ways crucial to my academic performance. I think that having a 
peer advisor as opposed to just the regular counselors working in the University is very 
important. With all the stress that universities cause their students – financially or otherwise, it's 
really nice to know there is a program like Opportunity Knocks to help students every step of the 
way.” Overall, this feedback leaves us feeling that most treated students were aware of and 
engaged with OK, and that a large minority expected some benefit. Others who thought the 
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program would have little effect seem to feel this way because they were already anxious to 
succeed and willing to devote time to their studies.  
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
The OK program was popular with participants: sign-up rates and program engagement 
were high, and in follow-up focus group interviews many program participants were enthusiastic 
about their experiences. This enthusiasm probably reflects the high award rates for OK. It’s 
therefore disappointing that, despite the introduction of substantial awards at almost every 
relevant level of achievement, overall program effects on achievement were modest. On the plus 
side, treated second-year students earned more in OK scholarship money than we would have 
expected based on the control-group grade distribution, increased the number of courses in which 
they earned a grade of 70, and gained a few grade points above 70. This localized response to the 
large program incentive to earn a grade of 70 percent did not translate into a substantial boost in 
overall achievement, though it was noticeably stronger in the subsample of students who appear 
to have understood the OK award scheme well. 
The past decade has seen a growing number of randomized evaluations of pay-for-
performance schemes for students at various levels and quasi-experimental studies looking at 
effects of state-based merit aid programs. Table 9 summarizes studies using randomized designs 
to look at financial incentives in college and Table 10 lists results from quasi-experimental 
studies of state-based merit scholarships.12 A number of randomized evaluations show effects on 
credits earned in response to incentives for course completion and grade thresholds (see, for 
example, MacDonald et al. 2009; Cha and Patel 2010; Barrow et al. 2012). These results, along 
with the findings in Angrist et al. (2009) and those reported here suggest that students react to 
threshold targets more strongly than to marginal incentives beyond the initial target. Our linear 
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incentive scheme came with a fairly forgiving target required to get payments started, a fact that 
may have induced a stronger threshold response. The OK program’s novel linear incentive of $20 
per percentage point provides a lower bound (in this context at least) on the marginal incentive 
needed to induce substantially higher student effort over a broad range of grades, especially for 
first years.  
We were also surprised when the OK demonstration failed to replicate the strong positive 
results for women seen in the STAR experiment. Women may have shown a weaker, localized 
response to OK because they could strategically target and attain the class-specific OK minimum 
award standard; targeting the GPA award levels in STAR was likely harder. Men did not target 
their grades as accurately in OK, yet they did not respond to STAR’s incentives. Perhaps the 
STAR GPA awards were simply too uncertain to motivate men, but at minimum, these results 
suggest that incentive size, targeting ability, and gender effects matter and interact. 
Incentives seem to be more effective when combined with academic support services. On 
balance, however, the picture that emerges from Table 9 and from this study is one of mostly 
modest effects. In particular, overall GPA seems largely unaffected except in some subgroups, 
and Angrist et al. (2009) is the only randomized evaluation to date to find college achievement 
effects persisting into the post-treatment period. Table 10 describes similarly discouraging results 
from studies of state-based merit aid programs. A few studies have found positive effects, most 
notably Scott-Clayton’s (2011) evaluation of the West Virginia PROMISE. However, other 
positive results appear weaker in light of updated empirical work (Sjoquist and Winters 2012a, 
2012b) and a better understanding of selection effects (Cohodes and Goodman 2013). 
One general explanation for the muted effectiveness of merit scholarships may be that 
poor performing students have trouble developing effective study strategies. For example, Israeli 
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high school students have easy access to test-focused study sessions in public school, a fact that 
may explain some of the stronger Angrist and Lavy (2009) results on achievement awards for 
high school girls. Indeed, second-year students may have responded more strongly in our study 
precisely because they have a better sense for how to improve their grades. Fryer (2011) 
similarly argues that incentives for learning (in his case, reading books) look more promising 
than pay for performance on achievement tests. These intriguing results come from elementary 
and secondary school settings. Investigation of the merits of as-yet-untried recipes combining 
learning incentives with academic support schemes seems a worthy priority for future research 
on college achievement. 
Our study also indicates that program awareness and understanding could be important 
aspects of college incentive design. The positive effects of OK, though muted, are concentrated 
among students who understood the awards formula well. And, about 14 percent of students 
assigned to treatment did not engage with the program in any way, suggesting that treatment 
effects on those who were aware of the program were actually larger than the OLS estimates. 
These two subgroups are not representative, but their responses suggest that simple, high-profile 
programs may be more successful and that program effects may evolve over time as awareness 
and understanding increase. 
There are potentially unlimited variations of financial incentives alone. In the context of 
past work, the Opportunity Knocks project suggests that future studies should consider all 
aspects of design to have a chance at success, including incentive size, targeting ability, 
excitement and awareness, simplicity, and gender considerations. In particular, students appear 
driven by large threshold payments that are hard to target. Creative designs such as lottery- or 
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games-based payments or incentives leveraging social support or competition may be able to 
capitalize on this behavior, improve effort in new ways, and keep costs low. 
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1. Randomized trials and quasi-experimental evaluations of financial incentives have been 
somewhat more encouraging for elementary and secondary students than for college students. 
Studies showing substantial positive effects on primary or secondary school students include 
Angrist et al. (2002), Henry and Rubinstein (2002), Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2009), 
Angrist and Lavy (2009), Dearden et al. (2009), Pallais (2009), and Dee (2011). Also in a 
primary or secondary context, Fryer (2012) reports large effects of aligned parent, teacher, and 
student incentives and Levitt et al. (2011) demonstrate some response to immediate rewards for 
test performance. Other recent experimental studies at this level have generated less reason for 
optimism. See, for example, Bettinger (2012), Rodriguez-Planas (2010), and Fryer (2011), who 
evaluate an array of award schemes for primary and middle school students in a variety of 
settings. For a general review of research on financial incentives, see Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-
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Biel (2011). 
2. Tuition at this university is around $5,000 per year. 
3. Payoffs were doubled and issued in the spring for year-long courses. 
4. Attrition was also balanced between treatment and control (about 5 percent of OK participants 
dropped out during the study), and treatment and control group dropouts have similar 
characteristics (results are available upon request). 
5. Ashenfelter and Plant (1990) use a similar hypothetical payment outcome to measure the labor 
supply effects of exposure to a negative income tax. 
6. Additional controls include parental education, an indicator for English mother tongue, and 
indicators for students who answered scholarship formula questions correctly. 
7. Restricting the fall and spring samples to be the same as the full-year sample generates effects 
for the full year equal to the sum of the fall and spring effects. Estimated effects for the full year 
need not equal the sum (or average) of the two semester effects because the full-year sample 
differs slightly from the sample for either semester alone. 
8. GPA is not a linear transformation of average grades, so we expect slight differences in results. 
Effects on GPA should be more similar to effects on earnings, since GPA also jumps at 70 
percent. 
9. Similar analysis on courses graded above thresholds from 80 to 100 percent demonstrates little 
difference between treatment and control students. 
10. Roughly 100 program participants dropped out between the first and second years. Dropout 
rates were similar in the treatment and control groups. 
11. Some students may have been aware of the financial awards, even though they failed to 
check their earnings or otherwise engage with the program. In this case, the reported first stage 
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effects on participation/awareness will be slightly too small, leading to inflated 2SLS estimates. 
Also, there is control noncompliance in the sense that control students have access to standard 
university support services. Therefore, the support services aspect of the OK treatment should be 
interpreted as a more engaging addition to a similar service, rather than a new program 
implemented in a vacuum (Heckman et al. 2000). 
12. The studies listed in Table 9 use random assignment to evaluate financial incentives for 
college students. This list is the result of a citation search (that is, citing studies we were 
previously aware of), a keyword search (for “experiment, incentives, college”) using Google 
Scholar, and helpful suggestions from anonymous referees. Table 10 was constructed similarly 
based on studies using difference in differences, regression discontinuity, event study designs to 
test impacts of state-based merit aid programs on college performance and completion. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Covariate Balance by Gender 
  Women   
  
Men  
First Years   Second Years   First Years   Second Years   
 Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment 
All  
 Mean Difference Mean Difference Mean Difference Mean Difference Mean Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Age 18.2 -0.105 19.2 0.011 18.4 0.014 19.2 0.069 18.7 -0.012 
 [0.608] (0.056) * [0.514] (0.056) [0.815] (0.104) [0.460] (0.070) [0.757] (0.036) 
High school 82.8 0.145 82.4 0.302 82.3 -0.344 82.1 -0.387 82.5 -0.024 
grade average [6.56] (0.238) [6.19] (0.217) [6.44] (0.310) [6.73] (0.338) [6.44] (0.134) 
1st language 0.404 0.057 0.426 -0.046 0.479 -0.060 0.333 0.097 0.416 0.009 
is English [0.491] (0.056) [0.495] (0.057) [0.501] (0.065) [0.474] (0.069) [0.493] (0.031) 
Mother a college 0.395 0.065 0.477 -0.016 0.479 0.050 0.424 -0.034 0.439 0.020 
graduate [0.490] (0.056) [0.500] (0.058) [0.501] (0.065) [0.497] (0.070) [0.496] (0.031) 
Father a college 0.479 0.051 0.581 0.009 0.603 0.047 0.475 0.105 0.532 0.049 
graduate [0.500] (0.057) [0.494] (0.058) [0.491] (0.063) [0.502] (0.071) [0.499] (0.031) 
Correctly answered harder 0.616 0.022 0.690 -0.010 0.719 -0.080 0.697 0.002 0.666 -0.014 
question on scholarship formula [0.487] (0.053) [0.464] (0.054) [0.451] (0.061) [0.462] (0.065) [0.472] (0.029) 
Controls who would have 0.883  0.968  0.908  0.978  0.923  
earned some scholarship money [0.322]  [0.177]  [0.289]  [0.148]  [0.266]  
Hypothetical earnings for 1,240  1,390  1,430  1,400  1,330  
controls [1,220]  [1,090]  [1,230]  [1,270]  [1,190] 
Observations 449 377 246 199 1,271 
F test for joint significance 1.11 0.453 0.858 1.43 0.515 
 {0.355} {0.843} {0.525} {0.198} {0.797} 
Notes: “Control Mean” columns report averages and standard deviations for variables in the left-most column, within the relevant 
gender-year subgroup. "Treatment Difference" columns report coefficients from regressions of each variable in the left-most column 
on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (gender, year in school, and high school grade quartile). The last row presents 
within-column F tests of joint significance of all treatment differences. Control group standard deviations are in square brackets, 
robust standard errors are in parentheses, and p values for F tests are in curly braces. Some respondents did not answer the parents' 
education questions. They are coded as a separate category (“missing”) and are not coded as high school or college graduates. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 2 
Fraction of Treated Students Making Program-Related Contact by Gender and Year 
  Women   Men   
 First Second  First Second  First Second  
All  
 Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All 
Contact Type (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Emailed advisor (Fall) 0.450 0.390 0.420 0.410 0.270 0.340 0.430 0.330 0.380 
 
Emailed advisor (Spring) 0.520 0.440 0.480 0.660 0.380 0.520 0.590 0.410 0.500 
 
Emailed advisor (Fall or 0.790 0.700 0.745 0.750 0.560 0.655 0.770 0.630 0.700 
Spring)  
Checked scholarship earnings 0.760 0.780 0.770 0.650 0.710 0.680 0.705 0.745 0.725 
online 
Emailed the program website 0.270 0.320 0.295 0.250 0.300 0.275 0.260 0.310 0.285 
 
Any contact 0.900 0.870 0.885 0.840 0.840 0.840 0.870 0.855 0.863 
 
Observations 100 100 200 100 100 200 200 200 400 
Notes: This table shows the proportion making the indicated form of program-related contact.   
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Table 3 
Effects on (Hypothetical) Program Earnings 
  Women   Men   
 First Second  First Second  First Second  
All  
 Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
    Panel A. Fall 
Control 645 695 667 770 774 760 682 707 693 
mean [657] [589] [628] [670] [642] [658] [663] [602] [637] 
Treatment -18.8 99.7 39.9 33.9 49.2 11.9 -5.73 72.0 28.0 
effect (53.1) (60.9) (39.9) (69.8) (73.1) (51.3) (41.9) (45.9) (31.1) 
N 444 374 818 246 195 441 690 569 1,259 
 
    Panel B. Spring 
Control 589 711 640 644 655 649 605 696 642 
mean [608] [598] [606] [600] [683] [633] [606] [622] [614] 
Treatment -57.6 24.7 -19.1 -20.0 170 35.5 -52.5 77.3 4.47 
effect (49.4) (66.4) (39.6) (59.5) (80.7) ** (49.4) (37.6) (51.0) (30.8) 
N 441 340 781 242 183 425 683 523 1,206 
 
    Panel C. Full Year 
Control 1,240 1,390 1,300 1,430 1,400 1,420 1,290 1,390 1,330 
mean [1,220] [1,090] [1,170] [1,230] [1,270] [1,240] [1,230] [1,140] [1,190] 
Treatment -80.2 165 33.0 7.01 255 54.8 -64.3 180 41.1 
effect (95.3) (121) (74.1) (121) (144)* (95.2) (74.3) (91.3) ** (58.2) 
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1,203 
Notes: “Control Mean” rows list averages and standard deviations of program earnings, within 
the relevant gender-year subgroup. “Treatment Effect” rows report coefficients from regressions 
of program earnings on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (gender, year in 
school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether 
students' first language is English, parents' education, and whether students answered questions 
on program rules correctly. Control earnings are hypothetical; treated earnings are actual. Full 
year courses are double-weighted in the earnings calculation. The sample used for the full year 
estimates includes students with grades in fall and spring. The fall analysis omits full year 
courses. If we restrict the fall and spring samples to be the same as the full year sample, then the 
effects for the full year are the sum of the fall and spring effects (this is also true in later tables). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard deviations are in square brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4a 
Effects on Average Grades 
  Women   Men   
 First Second  First Second  First Second  
All  
 Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
    Panel A. Fall 
Control 68.1 71.0 69.4 70.7 72.4 71.4 68.9 71.4 70.0 
mean [11.6] [8.40] [10.4] [10.9] [8.39] [10.0] [11.4] [8.41] [10.3] 
Treatment 0.424 0.420 0.461 0.452 -0.520 -0.496 0.236 0.064 0.076 
effect (0.945) (0.947) (0.662) (1.18) (1.07) (0.827) (0.740) (0.694) (0.515) 
N 444 374 818 246 195 441 690 569 1,259 
 
    Panel B. Spring 
Control 67.4 71.2 68.9 68.8 70.0 69.3 67.8 70.8 69.0 
mean [11.3] [9.02] [10.5] [11.2] [10.6] [10.9] [11.2] [9.46] [10.6] 
Treatment -0.814 -0.118 -0.471 -0.971 2.54 0.106 -0.966 0.727 -0.225 
effect (1.16) (1.13) (0.801) (1.56) (1.41)* (1.03) (0.901) (0.901) (0.634) 
N 441 340 781 242 183 425 683 523 1,206 
 
    Panel C. Full Year 
Control 67.9 71.1 69.2 69.9 71.5 70.5 68.4 71.2 69.6 
mean [10.7] [7.77] [9.69] [10.3] [8.59] [9.70] [10.6] [7.99] [9.70] 
Treatment -0.323 0.470 0.076 -0.233 1.17 -0.146 -0.458 0.614 -0.025 
effect (0.958) (0.932) (0.662) (1.21) (1.09) (0.840) (0.745) (0.719) (0.522) 
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1,203 
Notes: “Control Mean” rows list averages and standard deviations of average grades, within the 
relevant gender-year subgroup. “Treatment Effect” rows report coefficients from regressions of 
average grades on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (year in school, and high 
school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether students' first 
language is English, parents' education, and whether students answered questions on program 
rules correctly. Average grades are on a 100 point scale. Full year courses are double-weighted in 
the average grade calculation. The sample used for the full year estimates includes students with 
grades in fall and spring. The fall analysis omits full year courses. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses; standard deviations are in square brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4b 
Effects on GPA 
  Women   Men   
 First Second  First Second  First Second  
All  
 Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
    Panel A. Fall 
Control 2.39 2.64 2.50 2.61 2.75 2.66 2.46 2.67 2.55 
mean [0.982] [0.765] [0.900] [0.920] [0.743] [0.856] [0.968] [0.760] [0.890] 
Treatment 0.021 0.046 0.038 0.046 -0.039 -0.034 0.014 0.015 0.009 
effect (0.079) (0.081) (0.056) (0.103) (0.098) (0.073) (0.063) (0.061) (0.044) 
N 444 374 818 246 195 441 690 569 1,259 
 
    Panel B. Spring 
Control 2.34 2.64 2.47 2.47 2.54 2.50 2.38 2.61 2.48 
mean [0.916] [0.783] [0.875] [0.935] [0.880] [0.912] [0.922] [0.810] [0.885] 
Treatment -0.049 0.018 -0.016 -0.003 0.266 0.071 -0.037 0.102 0.022 
effect (0.081) (0.090) (0.059) (0.106) (0.119)** (0.079) (0.064) (0.073) (0.048) 
N 441 340 781 242 183 425 683 523 1,206 
 
   Panel C. Full Year 
Control 2.37 2.64 2.49 2.55 2.67 2.59 2.42 2.65 2.52 
mean [0.895] [0.689] [0.825] [0.870] [0.739] [0.822] [0.890] [0.702] [0.825] 
Treatment -0.021 0.055 0.018 0.019 0.126 0.021 -0.019 0.075 0.019 
effect (0.073) (0.079) (0.053) (0.096) (0.097) (0.070) (0.058) (0.061) (0.042) 
N 441 339 780 242 181  423 683 520 1,203 
Notes: “Control Mean” rows list averages and standard deviations of GPA, within the relevant 
gender-year subgroup. “Treatment Effect” rows report coefficients from regressions of GPA on a 
treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (year in school, and high school grade quartile) 
and controls for high school grade average, whether students' first language is English, parents' 
education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. GPA is on a four 
point scale. The sample used for the full year estimates includes students with grades in fall and 
spring. The fall analysis omits full year courses. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 
standard deviations are in square brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5 
Effects on Components of the OK Scholarship Formula 
  Women   Men   
 First Second  First Second  First Second  
All  
 Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
  Panel A. Number of Courses with Grade of At Least 70 Percent 
Control 4.58 5.22 4.85 5.18 5.01 5.11 4.75 5.16 4.92 
mean [3.35] [2.84] [3.16] [3.17] [2.96] [3.08] [3.30] [2.87] [3.14] 
Treatment -0.034 0.422 0.185 0.128 0.954 0.338 -0.010 0.572 0.239 
effect (0.260) (0.335) (0.205) (0.356) (0.405)** (0.268) (0.208) (0.252)** (0.161) 
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1,203 
 
  Panel B. Total Grade Percentage Points Over 70 Percent 
Control 38.9 43.3 40.8 45.5 45.0 45.3 40.9 43.8 42.1 
mean [46.2] [42.1] [44.5] [47.4] [50.4] [48.5] [46.6] [44.4] [45.7] 
Treatment -3.84 6.16 0.726 -0.290 7.98 1.05 -3.17 6.15 0.861 
effect (3.76) (4.64) (2.88) (4.57) (5.49) (3.62) (2.87) (3.52)* (2.25) 
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1,203 
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel A is the total number of courses in which the student 
received a grade at 70 percent or higher over both semesters. In Panel B, the dependent variable 
is the sum of the percentage points by which the student's grades exceeded 70 percent. “Control 
Mean” rows list averages and standard deviations, within the relevant gender-year subgroup. 
“Treatment Effect” rows report coefficients from regressions on a treatment dummy, with 
sampling strata controls (gender, year in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for 
high school grade average, whether students' first language is English, parents' education, and 
whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. Full year courses are double-
weighted in the calculation of both dependent variables. The sample used to make this table 
includes students with grades in fall and spring. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 
standard deviations are in square brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 6 
Full Year Effects (Students Who Calculated Awards Correctly) 
  Women   Men   
 First Second  First Second  First Second  
All  
 Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
(Hypothetical) Program -218 219 -9.32 102 370 160 -80.4 245 63.7 
earnings (130)* (155) (101) (144) (172)** (111) (97.2) (114)** (74.8) 
 
Average grades -1.23 0.999 -0.161 0.839 1.73 0.754 -0.351 1.03 0.219 
 (1.10) (1.12) (0.779) (1.51) (1.31) (1.00) (0.913) (0.879) (0.634) 
 
GPA -0.107 0.112 -0.002 0.123 0.167 0.103 -0.008 0.117 0.044 
 (0.088) (0.095) (0.064) (0.118) (0.117) (0.083) (0.072) (0.074) (0.052) 
 
Number of courses with -0.339 0.715 0.165 0.429 1.19 0.637 -0.008 0.813 0.353 
grade of at least 70 percent (0.333) (0.410)* (0.264) (0.431) (0.497)** (0.323)** (0.265) (0.309) *** (0.203)* 
 
Total grade percentage -9.21 7.38 -1.29 2.97 12.6 4.82 -3.98 8.19 1.42 
points over 70 percent (5.25)* (5.98) (3.96) (5.37) (6.49)* (4.19) (3.81) (4.37)* (2.91) 
 
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1,203 
Notes: “Number of Courses with Grade of At Least 70 Percent” is the total number of courses in which the student received a grade at 
70 percent or higher. “Total Grade Percentage Points Over 70 Percent” is the sum of the percentage points by which the student's 
grades exceeded 70 percent. Each row reports coefficients from regressions of the indicated variable on a treatment dummy, with 
sampling strata controls (gender, year in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether 
students' first language is English, parents' education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. Full year 
courses are double-weighted in the calculation of the dependent variables. The sample used to make this table includes students with 
grades in fall and spring.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7 
Effects in Fall 2009 
  Women   Men   
 First Second  First Second  First Second  
All  
 Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
(Hypothetical) Program 7.22 60.0 33.5 77.6 22.8 36.8 22.7 54.1 33.0 
earnings (58.4) (68.7) (44.2) (73.2) (77.9) (52.7) (45.2) (51.4) (33.9) 
 
Average grades 1.44 0.344 0.844 1.36 -2.16 -0.448 1.35 -0.618 0.299 
 (0.917) (1.17) (0.736) (1.49) (1.46) (1.06) (0.803)* (0.912) (0.603) 
 
GPA 0.148 0.019 0.082 0.083 -0.144 -0.037 0.119 -0.041 0.033 
 (0.079)* (0.096) (0.062) (0.127) (0.122) (0.088) (0.068)* (0.074) (0.050) 
 
Number of courses with 0.196 0.166 0.180 0.224 0.072 0.127 0.197 0.131 0.145 
grade of at least 70 percent (0.163) (0.184) (0.121) (0.226) (0.230) (0.162) (0.132) (0.141) (0.096) 
 
Total grade percentage -0.620 2.17 0.776 2.76 0.782 1.21 0.152 2.05 0.921 
points over 70 percent (2.32) (2.69) (1.75) (2.74) (3.02) (1.99) (1.75) (2.02) (1.32) 
 
N 395 334 729 209 165 374 604 499 1,103 
Notes: “Number of Courses with Grade of At Least 70 Percent” is the total number of courses in which the student received a grade at 
70 percent or higher. “Total Grade Percentage Points Over 70 Percent” is the sum of the percentage points by which the student's 
grades exceeded 70 percent. Each row reports coefficients from regressions of the indicated variable on a treatment dummy, with 
sampling strata controls (gender, year in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether 
students' first language is English, parents' education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. Full year 
courses are excluded from the calculation of all five dependent variables. “First Year” and “Second Year” continue to refer to the 
students' standing during the program period. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8 
IV Estimates for Participants – Panel A: Full Sample 
  Women   Men   
 First Second  First Second  First Second  
All  
 Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
First stage (any contact) 0.901 0.891 0.897 0.844 0.874 0.858 0.876 0.882 0.878 
 (0.029) *** (0.032) *** (0.022) *** (0.037) *** (0.035)*** (0.025)*** (0.023)*** (0.024)*** (0.017)*** 
Second stages: 
 (Hypothetical) Program -89.0 186 36.8 8.31 292 63.9 -73.4 204 46.8 
 earnings (104) (131) (81.3) (139) (156)* (108) (83.6) (101)** (65.4) 
 
 Average grades -0.359 0.527 0.084 -0.276 1.34 -0.171 -0.523 0.696 -0.029 
  (1.05) (1.02) (0.727) (1.38) (1.18) (0.956) (0.840) (0.795) (0.587) 
 
 GPA -0.023 0.062 0.020 0.023 0.144 0.024 -0.022 0.084 0.021 
  (0.079) (0.086) (0.058) (0.110) (0.105) (0.080) (0.065) (0.068) (0.047) 
  
 Number of courses -0.037 0.473 0.206 0.152 1.09 0.394 -0.011 0.648 0.272 
 with grade of at least  (0.283) (0.362) (0.225) (0.407) (0.437)** (0.304) (0.234) (0.277)** (0.180) 
 70 percent 
 Total grade percentage -4.27 6.92 0.809 -0.344 9.14 1.22 -3.62 6.97 0.981 
 points over 70 percent (4.11) (5.05) (3.16) (5.23) (5.96) (4.12) (3.24) (3.89)* (2.53) 
 
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1,203 
  
Angrist, Oreopoulos, and Williams 43 
Table 8 (continued) 
IV Estimates for Participants – Panel B: Students Who Calculated Awards Correctly 
  Women   Men   
 First Second  First Second  First Second  
All  
 Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
First stage (any contact) 0.922 0.907 0.915 0.863 0.900 0.875 0.896 0.895 0.895 
 (0.033) *** (0.035) *** (0.024) *** (0.043) *** (0.037)*** (0.030)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.019)*** 
Second stages: 
 (Hypothetical) Program -237 241 -10.2 119 411 183 -89.8 274 71.2 
 earnings (139)* (164) (108) (158) (178)** (123) (106) (123)** (82.0) 
 
 Average grades -1.34 1.10 -0.176 0.972 1.92 0.862 -0.392 1.15 0.245 
  (1.16) (1.19) (0.835) (1.66) (1.35) (1.10) (0.997) (0.950) (0.696) 
 
 GPA -0.116 0.123 -0.002 0.143 0.186 0.117 -0.008 0.130 0.049 
  (0.094) (0.101) (0.069) (0.129) (0.120) (0.091) (0.079) (0.080) (0.057) 
  
 Number of courses -0.368 0.788 0.181 0.497 1.32 0.729 -0.009 0.908 0.394 
 with grade of at least  (0.353) (0.432)* (0.282) (0.475) (0.511)** (0.356)** (0.289) (0.332)*** (0.222)* 
 70 percent 
 Total grade percentage -9.99 8.13 -1.41 3.45 14.0 5.51 -4.44 9.15 1.59 
 points over 70 percent (5.58)* (6.34) (4.25) (5.91) (6.71)** (4.62) (4.16) (4.73)* (3.19) 
 
N 274 236 510 166 127 293 440 163 803 
Notes: “First Stage (Any Contact)” rows report coefficients from a regression of a dummy variable equal to one if the student made 
any program-related contact (see Table 2) on a treatment dummy. “Second Stage” rows report coefficients from IV regressions, 
instrumenting for the program contact dummy with the treatment dummy. All regressions include sampling strata controls (gender, 
year in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether students' first language is English, 
parents' education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. Full year courses are double-weighted in the 
calculation of second stage dependent variables. The sample used for this table includes students with grades in fall and spring. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9 
Randomized Evaluations of College Achievement Awards 
  
 Study Sample Treatment Outcome All Men Women 
Effects  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Angrist, Lang, First year students at $1,000 for C+ to B- first First year GPA 0.010 -0.110 0.086 
 and Oreopoulos Canadian commuter year performance, $5,000  (0.066) (0.103) (0.084) 
 (2009) [The university in 2005- for B+ to A performance  [1.805] [1.908] [1.728] 
 Student 2006, except for top (varies by HS grade) First year credits earned -0.012 -0.157 0.084 
 Achievement HS grade quartile   (0.064) (0.106) (0.082) 
 and Retention    [2.363] [2.453] [2.298] 
 Project]   Second year GPA -0.018 -0.081 0.030 
     (0.066) (0.108) (0.085) 
     [2.040] [2.084] [2.008] 
    Second year credits 0.027 0.155 -0.024 
    earned (0.108) (0.180) (0.137) 
     [2.492] [2.468] [2.509] 
   Incentives and support First year GPA 0.210 0.084 0.267 
   services  (0.092)** (0.162) (0.117)** 
     [1.805]  [1.908] [1.728] 
    First year credits earned 0.092  -0.196 0.269 
     (0.087)  (0.015) (0.108)** 
     [2.363]  [2.453] [2.298] 
    Second year GPA 0.072  -0.170 0.276 
     (0.091)  (0.161) (0.106)*** 
     [2.040]  [2.084] [2.008] 
    Second year credits 0.072  -0.240 0.280 
    earned (0.130)  (0.206) (0.172) 
     [2.492]  [2.468] [2.509] 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Randomized Evaluations of College Achievement Awards 
  
 Study Sample Treatment Outcome All Men Women 
Effects  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
2. Angrist, First year students Over two semesters and for First year GPA -0.019 0.019 -0.021 
 Oreopoulos, and on financial aid at each semester-long course,  (0.058) (0.096) (0.073) 
 Williams (2013) Canadian commuter $100 for attaining at least 70  [2.42] [2.55] [2.37] 
 [Opportunity university in 2008- percent and $20 for each GPA, fall term of 0.119 0.083 0.148 
 Knocks] 2009 percentage point higher than year after program (0.068)* (0.127) (0.079)* 
   this (full course load = 10  [2.60]  [2.58] [2.61] 
  Second year semester courses) First year GPA 0.075  0.126 0.055 
  students on   (0.061)  (0.097) (0.079) 
  financial aid at   [2.65]  [2.67] [2.64] 
  Canadian commuter  GPA, fall term of -0.014  -0.144 0.019 
  University in 2008-  year after program (0.026)  (0.122) (0.096) 
  2009   [2.83]  [2.79] [2.85] 
3. Barrow et al. Low-income parents For each of two semesters,  First year GPA 0.068 
 (2010) [Opening beginning $250 for at least half-time  (0.104) 
 Doors Louisiana] community college enrollment, $250 for C average  [2.171]   
  in Louisiana or better at end of midterms, First year credits 3.345  sample is mostly 
  between 2004 and and $500 for maintaining a C earned (0.849)*** female 
  2005 average, plus optional  [7.623]  
   Enhanced college counseling Registered one year 0.053 
    after program year (0.038) 
4. Cha and Patel Low-income Ohio $1,800 for earning a grade of C First year credits 0.5 
 (2010) [Ohio college students in or better in 12 or more credits, attempted (0.8) 
 Performance- 2008 with children or $900 for a C or better in 6 to  [19.5]  sample is mostly 
 Based Scholarship and eligible for 11 credits, with payments at First year credits 2.0  female 
 Demonstration] TANF end of each semester earned (0.5)***  
     [13.4] 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Randomized Evaluations of College Achievement Awards 
  
 Study Sample Treatment Outcome All Men Women 
Effects  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
5. De Paola, First year business $1,000 for students with the 30 Cumulative exam 6.023 5.390 5.841 
 Scoppa, and students at the highest cumulative scores on score (3.059)** (4.615) (4.061) 
 Nistico (2010) University of all exams Credits earned 2.335  1.759 2.490 
  Calabria in 2008-   (1.197)** (1.854) (1.518)* 
  2009 $350 for students with the 30 Cumulative exam 5.350  2.354 6.157 
   highest cumulative scores on  score (3.164)* (4.877) (4.207) 
   all exams Credits earned 2.194  0.714 2.766 
     (1.266)* (1.970) (1.655)* 
6. Leuven, First year economics $600 for completion of all first Met first year 0.046 
 Oosterbeek, and and business year requirements by start of requirements (0.065) 
 van der Klaauw students at the new academic year  [0.195] 
 (2010) University of  Total “credit points” -1.2   
  Amsterdam in 2001-  in first three years (9.8)  
  2002   [84.3]  not reported 
   $200 for completion of all first Met first year 0.007 
   year requirements by start of  requirements (0.062) 
   new academic year  [0.195] 
    Total “credit points” -2.5 
    in first three years (9.6) 
     [84.3] 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Randomized Evaluations of College Achievement Awards 
  
 Study Sample Treatment Outcome All Men Women 
Effects  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
7. Leuven et al. First year economics $1,250 for the student with the Microeconomics 0.974 
 (2011) and business top microeconomics exam  exam score (0.877) 
  students at the score  [18.7] 
  University of $3,750 for the student with the Microeconomics 1.184 
  Amsterdam in 2004- top microeconomics exam exam score (0.617)* not reported 
  2005 and 2005-2006 score  [18.9] 
   $6,250 for the student with the Microeconomics -0.629 
   top microeconomics exam exam score (0.644) 
   score  [21.2] 
8. MacDonald et al. At-risk students $750 each of three semesters First semester GPA 0.08   0.12 
 (2009) beginning for 1) obtaining 2.0 GPA or  during program p>0.1   p>0.1 
 [Foundations community college higher, 2) eligible to continue (missing imputed) [2.11]   [2.20] 
 for Success] in Ontario, Canada, in a full program the following Second semester GPA 0.12   0.14 
  between 2007 and semester, and 3) completing at during program p<0.05**  p<0.05** 
  2008 least 12 hours of tutorial, case (missing imputed) [1.88]  not [2.04] 
   management, or career Third semester GPA 0.01  reported 0.12 
   workshops during program p>0.1   p<0.05** 
    (missing imputed) [2.01]   [2.16] 
    Registered in fourth 0.02   0.014 
    semester (after p>0.1   p>0.1 
    program) [0.557]   [0.58] 
9. Miller et al. Low-income  $1,000 each of four semesters First semester credits 0.0 
 (2011) [New students starting at for 1) obtaining 2.0 GPA or earned (0.2) 
 Mexico the University of higher, 2) enrolling full time,  [12.8]  not reported 
 Performance- New Mexico in fall, and 3) completing two extra Second semester 0.6 
 Based Scholarship 2008, and fall, 2009 advisor meetings per semester credits earned (0.3)* 
 Demonstration]    [11.1] 
 
Angrist, Oreopoulos, and Williams 48 
Table 9 (continued) 
Randomized Evaluations of College Achievement Awards 
  
 Study Sample Treatment Outcome All Men Women 
Effects  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
10. Richburg-Hayes New York City Up to $1,300 each of two or  First semester credits 0.6 
 Sommo, and community college three semesters, paid in earned (0.3)* 
 Welbeck (2011) students aged 22-35 installments for achieving  [8.1]  not reported 
 [New York who required 1) registration, 2) continued Second semester 0.6 
 Performance- remediation fall,  mid-semester enrollment, and credits earned (0.4) 
 Based Scholarship 2008, through fall, 3) 2.0 GPA in at least six credits  [9.3] 
 Demonstration] 2009 
Notes: The table reports main baseline sample outcomes for grades, credits earned, and measures of persistence. Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. Control means are shown in square brackets. See text for sources and more details 
* significant at 10% level. ** significant at 5% level. *** significant at 1% level 
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Table 10 
Quasi-Randomized Evaluations of Merit-Based College Scholarships 
 Study Treatment Methodology Outcome Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1. Castleman (2013) FMS: 75 percent of public college tuition Difference in FL public college credits, four -0.634 
 [Bright Futures and fees for students with a 3.0 high school differences, non-  years (1.844) 
 Scholarship, GPA and at least 20 on the ACT or 970 on  eligible students as FL public college BA in four 0.011  
 Florida Medallion the SAT controls years (0.019) 
 Scholars (FMS) FAS: 100 percent of public college tuition Difference in FL public college credits, four 8.466 
 and Florida and fees for students with a 3.5 high school differences, non- years (1.744)*** 
 Academic GPA and at least 28 on the ACT or 1270 on FMS students as FL public college BA in four 0.058 
 Scholars (FAS)] the SAT controls years (0.021)*** 
2. Cohodes and MA public school tuition waived (excluding Regression Enrolled on time at a four- 0.018 
 Goodman (2013) substantial fees) for students who score in the discontinuity on year college (0.005)*** 
 [John and Abigail top 25th percentile of their school district and tenth grade test  [0.710] 
 Adams attain minimum absolute benchmarks on the score Graduated in four years from -0.017 
 Scholarship statewide tenth grade test; must maintain 3.0  a four-year college (0.004)*** 
 Program (MA)] GPA in college   [0.418] 
3. Cornwell, Lee, Full tuition/fees at GA public colleges for Differences in Enrolled in full freshman -0.042 
 Mustard (2005) students with a 3.0 high school GPA; must differences, non- course load at University of (0.016)*** 
 [Georgia HOPE] maintain 3.0 GPA in college GA-resident students Georgia [0.812] 
   as controls Completed full freshman -0.060 
    course load at University of (0.019)*** 
    Georgia [0.588] 
4. Dynarski (2008) $1,000 at inception (now $2,500) for tuition/ Difference in  Fraction of age 22-34 0.0298 
 [Georgia HOPE fees at AR colleges for students with at least differences, other population with a college (0.004)*** 
 and Arkansas 19 on the ACT and a 2.5 core high school state populations as degree [0.337] 
 merit aid GPA; full tuition/fees at GA public colleges controls 
 program] for students with a 3.0 high school GPA; for  
  AR and GA, must maintain 3.0 GPA in 
  college 
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Table 10 
Quasi-Randomized Evaluations of Merit-Based College Scholarships 
 Study Treatment Methodology Outcome Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
5. Scott-Clayton Full tuition/fees at WV public colleges for Regression Cumulative four-year GPA 0.099 
 (2011) [West students with a 3.0 overall and core high discontinuity on  for WV public college students (0.045)** 
 Virginia school GPA and at least 21 on the ACT or  ACT score Earned BA in four years 0.094 
 PROMISE] 1000 on the SAT   (0.022)** 
   Event study, program Cumulative four-year GPA 0.039 
   introduction (small for WV public college students (0.018) 
   sample T-distribution Earned BA in four years 0.067 
   critical values)  (0.005)*** 
6. Sjoquist and $1,000 at inception (now $2,500) for tuition/ Difference in  Fraction of age 22-34 0.0091 
 Winters (2012a) fees at AR colleges for students with at least differences, other population with a college p=0.216 
 [Georgia HOPE 19 on the ACT and a 2.5 core high school state populations as degree [0.3567] 
 and Arkansas GPA; full tuition/fees at GA public colleges controls; increased 
 merit aid for students with a 3.0 high school GPA; for sample and updated 
 program] AR and GA, must maintain 3.0 GPA in clustering compared 
  College with Dynarski (2008) 
7. Sjoquist and  25 state merit aid programs with requirements Difference in Fraction of age 24-30 0.0009 
 Winters (2012a) on high school GPA, ACT/SAT scores, and differences, non- population with a college (0.0031) 
  college credit enrollment and GPA merit state degree [0.388] 
  Nine strongest state merit aid programs with populations as Fraction of age 24-30 0.0011 
  requirements on high school GPA, ACT/SAT controls population with a college (0.0037) 
  scores, and college credit enrollment and GPA  degree [0.388] 
Notes: The table reports main baseline sample outcomes for grades and measures of persistence. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. Control means are shown in square brackets. See text for sources and more details. 
* significant at 10% level. ** significant at 5% level. *** significant at 1% level    
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Figure 1 
Densities of Full Year (Hypothetical) Earnings 
Note: The figure plots the smoothed kernel densities of OK program earnings for the full year from fall 2008 through spring 2009. 
Control earnings are hypothetical; treated earnings are actual. Full-year courses are double-weighted in the earnings calculation. The 
sample used to make this figure includes students with grades in fall and spring. 
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Figure 2 
Full Year Effects on Number of Courses over Grade Thresholds 
Note: The figure shows treatment effects on the number of courses in which students earned a grade at or above a given threshold, 
where the thresholds are plotted on the x-axis.  Control densities are kernel density plots of grades at the course level using a normal 
kernel, taking only grades between 60 and 80 percent (inclusive).  Treatment effects were estimated using the same models as for 
Table 3. 
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